Synthesis talk:Beliefs and Worldviews

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Can we say anything about the "origin" or "nature" of "consciousness"? So, on the epistemological level, and using Kantian terms, QRI asks a question of an a priori type (having to do with intuition not deduction) and seeks to answer them through a posteriori procedures (empirical evidence), or in his and later uses of these terms, confuses the empirical and the transcendental. Methodologically, this then calls to use objective empirical methods to explore "something" non-objective — for consciousness is not an object in the way that a "ball falling to the ground" is an object. If it was, then what is it that would observe that object, since "consciousness" is supposed to be "what observes"? Not only is consciousness non-objective, but it cannot be distinguished from its objects — this is both an experiential fact and a logical necessity: examine Santideva's verse "If a space separates the faculty from its object,/How would they come into contact?/If no space separates them, then they will be one,/And in this case, what would come into contact with what?" Note that if by "consciousness" is meant a more restricted meaning of "the mind" or "the mental sense sphere", then one only needs to apply the previous reasoning to the specific faculty to prove that it is not a product of "the brain". But this is not an empirical observation. Empirical observation can't say anything about the brain, because empirically speaking, there is no brain, i.e., the "brain", as all objects, is a transcendent, it transcends individual experience (and according to some, is the cause of it, and "experience" is a sort of byproduct or even representation "in the brain", which also implies that the brain cannot be observed.) Finally, more generally, there are logical issues which apply to realist approaches in general, but which in this context point to specific problems regarding the "causes" and the notion of an "origin" of consciousness (viewed as a "thing", i.e., reified). The paradoxes of realist views are thoroughly examined in philosophical texts such as the prajñaparamita literature (Heart and Diamond Sutras being some of the best known examples as well as  Nagarjuna's works), which uses deep logical arguments disprove substantial/independent existence. The pre-socratic Eleatic school employed similar logical arguments to arrive at comparable conclusion, as seen for instance in Parmenides' poem, although his treatment is less systematic and extensive, but more poetic. Epistemology Methodology As I understand it, using empirical methods to test that a theory is "true" or not, means conceiving a model of how reality "really is" and then logically devising the necessary consequences of this theory being true through the laws of cause and effect. Specific consequences of the model can be turned into predictions (i.e., "if model X is true, then observation Y should be possible in such and such context"), and there should be specific observable effects in the world of experience. Actual empirical observations will then conform to predictions or not, and they are then said to offer evidence in favor or against the theory - which is a metaphysical view, basically. This forgets the initial epistemological made above. A priori knowledge is knowledge that cannot be derived from experience, or maybe better said - is presupposed in all experience : e.g. the a prioris of sensibility in Kant's system are "time" and "space". I would say that "consciousness" (although I use an expended definition of this compared to IONS) is presupposed in all experience, i.e. there cannot be any experience without there being "experientiality" or consciousness that co-arises with it and as its very phenomenal substance. Madhyamika reasoning can help us understand and see how "consciousness" and its "objects" cannot be ontologically distinguished, either spatially or temporally. See stanza 93, chapter IX in Śantideva's magnum opus, the Bodhicaryāvatara, which is about "wisdom", and which shows the problem with introducing "spatial" distinctions between "consciousness" and "the world": "If a space separates the faculty from its object, How would they come into contact? If no space separates them, then they will be one, And in this case, what would come into contact with what?" This applies to "moments in time" also. Examine a moment in time, with a beginning, middle and end. Then take another moment of time. What could be the connection between these distinct moments? They would be entirely external to one another. Some logical issues Secondly, on a more logical level. The implication of this proposal is that there are causes and conditions of consciousness which can be investigated empirically and that observation can give solid if not absolute bases for sound knowledge. This is implied in the physicalist theories they try to disprove, certainly (i.e., "consciousness arises from neurons"), but it is also the implication of engaging in procedures that test the validity of a metaphysical theory (on the nature of consciousness). If there are causes to consciousness, these causes must be different from consciousness. They must be temporally distinct from consciousness, as effects follow causes in time.  If consciousness is an effect of some temporally other cause then the cause exists in a different moment than consciousness, at a different point in time. This raises the insurmountable contradictions of positing that there are ontologically distinct moments of time, ontologically distinct substances, and ontologically distinct spatial locations. All of the paradoxes that arise from realist/substantialist theories follow. These are examined and thoroughly debunked in Nagarjuna's philosophical classical, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle-Way, and other prajñaparamita texts. I could not do it justice here, but regarding the issues with realist views, this classic text will be reflected on fruitfully. The following contains a summary of the four main types of logical reasonings used in the madhyamaka tradition to e : https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/mipham/four-great-logical-arguments. Conclusion Finally, regarding the argument that "the dominant worldview is physicalism": (1) I don't think it's true, as many people are in fact not that, and (2) conclusive proofs (such as the ones outlined here) have already been given that disprove physicalism, and the issue of disproving it only remains in contexts which implicitly take for granted the metaphysical realism, epistemologies and methods of such perspectives. Trying to disprove physicalism within this context will be difficult if not principally impossible, and does not seem particularly useful. Thus, my tongue-in-cheek empirical proposal is that the money of this prize could be put to better use than trying to prove something, which has already been proven, by using methods which cannot yield the sought-after proof.