Synthesis:Beliefs and Worldviews - Revision history

OlivierSandilands: /* Unknowing and mystery */

2026-07-08T08:47:10Z

Unknowing and mystery

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	=== Unknowing and mystery ===		=== Unknowing and mystery ===
	Many of the world's great mystics expound views of this sort. After all, the word "mystic" comes from "mystery". that of these systems which exhibit the radical limitations of any objective knowledge, theoretical knowledge, representational knowledge. This is sometimes done in favor of non-objective knowledge. Thus we are brought back from the order of metaphysical theories to the realm of practice — for non-objective knowledge is practical knowledge.		Many of the world's great mystics expound views of this sort. After all, the word "mystic" comes from "mystery". that of these systems which exhibit the radical limitations of any objective knowledge, theoretical knowledge, representational knowledge. This is sometimes done in favor of non-objective knowledge. Thus we are brought back from the order of metaphysical theories to the realm of practice — for non-objective knowledge is practical knowledge. This is sometimes dismissed as "Mysterianism", it seems to be where many contemplatives eventually lend in terms of seeking absolute answers to questions which are by necessity relative to linguistic categories; some examples for instance are Meister Eckhart or the cloude of Unknowing.

	This is sometimes dismissed as "Mysterianism".

	~~For~~ instance Meister Eckhart or ~~his forebear Dionysius~~ the ~~Areopagite.~~

	~~The~~ cloude of Unknowing.

	== Ontological agnosticism ==		== Ontological agnosticism ==

OlivierSandilands: /* Can we say anything about the "origin" or "nature" of "consciousness"? */

2026-07-08T08:45:27Z

Can we say anything about the "origin" or "nature" of "consciousness"?

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 == Can we say anything about the "origin" or "nature" of "consciousness"? ==
-So, on the epistemological level, and using Kantian terms, QRI asks a question of an ''a priori'' type (having to do with intuition not deduction) and seeks to answer them through ''a posteriori'' procedures (empirical evidence), or in his and later uses of these terms, confuses the empirical and the transcendental. Methodologically, this then calls to use objective empirical methods to explore "something" non-objective — for consciousness is not an object in the way that a "ball falling to the ground" is an object. If it was, then what is it that would observe that object, since "consciousness" is supposed to be "what observes"? Not only is consciousness non-objective, but it cannot be distinguished from its objects — this is both an experiential fact and a logical necessity: examine Santideva's verse
+So, on the epistemological level, and using Kantian terms, asking about the "origin" of consciousness is a question of an ''a priori'' type (having to do with intuition not deduction) and seeking to answer them through ''a posteriori'' procedures (empirical evidence), or in his and later uses of these terms, confuses the empirical and the transcendental. Methodologically, this then calls to use objective empirical methods to explore "something" non-objective — for consciousness is not an object in the way that a "ball falling to the ground" is an object. If it was, then what is it that would observe that object, since "consciousness" is supposed to be "what observes"? Not only is consciousness non-objective, but it cannot be distinguished from its objects — this is both an experiential fact and a logical necessity: examine Santideva's verse quoted above.
-"If a space separates the faculty from its object,/How would they come into contact?/If no space separates them, then they will be one,/And in this case, what would come into contact with what?"
+Using empirical methods to test that a theory is "true" or not, means conceiving a model of how reality "really is" and then logically devising the necessary consequences of this theory being true through the laws of cause and effect. Specific consequences of the model can be turned into predictions (i.e., "if model X is true, then observation Y should be possible in such and such context"), and there should be specific observable effects in the world of experience. Actual empirical observations will then conform to predictions or not, and they are then said to offer evidence in favor or against the theory — which is a metaphysical view, basically.
 Note that if by "consciousness" is meant a more restricted meaning of "the mind" or "the mental sense sphere", then one only needs to apply the previous reasoning to the specific faculty to prove that it is not a product of "the brain". But this is not an empirical observation. Empirical observation can't say anything about the brain, because empirically speaking, there is no brain, i.e., the "brain", as all objects, is a transcendent, it transcends individual experience (and according to some, is the cause of it, and "experience" is a sort of byproduct or even representation "in the brain", which also implies that the brain cannot be observed.)
-Finally, more generally, there are logical issues which apply to realist approaches in general, but which in this context point to specific problems regarding the "causes" and the notion of an "origin" of consciousness (viewed as a "thing", i.e., reified). The paradoxes of realist views are thoroughly examined in philosophical texts such as the prajñaparamita literature (Heart and Diamond Sutras being some of the best known examples as well as  Nagarjuna's works<ref>https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/mipham/four-great-logical-arguments</ref>), which uses deep logical arguments disprove substantial/independent existence. The pre-socratic Eleatic school employed similar logical arguments to arrive at comparable conclusion, as seen for instance in Parmenides' poem, although his treatment is less systematic and extensive, but more poetic.
+Finally, more generally, there are logical issues which apply to realist approaches in general, but which in this context point to specific problems regarding the causes and condition the notion of an "origin" of consciousness (viewed as a "thing", i.e., reified). The paradoxes of realist views are thoroughly examined in philosophical texts such as the prajñaparamita literature (Heart and Diamond Sutras being some of the best known examples as well as  Nagarjuna's works<ref>https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/mipham/four-great-logical-arguments</ref>), which uses deep logical arguments disprove substantial/independent existence — the following contains a summary of the four main types of logical reasonings used in the madhyamaka tradition to refute such ideas: <nowiki>https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/mipham/four-great-logical-arguments</nowiki>. The pre-socratic Eleatic school employed similar logical arguments to arrive at comparable conclusion, as seen for instance in Parmenides' poem above, although his treatment is less systematic and extensive, but more poetic.
 == References ==

OlivierSandilands at 20:20, 30 August 2025

2025-08-30T20:20:09Z

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	[[Synthesis:Emergent Phenomena\|Emergent phenomena]] are profoundly intertwined with beliefs, metaphysics and philosophy. [[~~Tradition~~:Source Traditions\|Source traditions]] (religions, philosophies, spiritualities) but also in many cases academic and scientific [[disciplines]] usually revolve around specific stories of the origins and ends of the world, the nature		[[Synthesis:Emergent Phenomena\|Emergent phenomena]] are profoundly intertwined with beliefs, metaphysics and philosophy. [[Synthesis:Source Traditions\|Source traditions]] (religions, philosophies, spiritualities) but also in many cases academic and scientific [[disciplines]] usually revolve around specific stories of the origins and ends of the world, the nature

	This domain includes a huge variety of relative idiosyncratic or culturally informed beliefs of the individual, as well as their ultimate beliefs — usually the same as or related with their cultural's worldview but not always — around questions like reality, substance, causality, properties, relations, categories of beings, universals, particulars, space, time, freedom, etc.<ref>Sjöstedt-Hughes, P. (2023). On the need for metaphysics in psychedelic therapy and research. ''Frontiers in Psychology'', ''14'', [[1128589. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1128589]]</ref> We'll go over the following aspects:		This domain includes a huge variety of relative idiosyncratic or culturally informed beliefs of the individual, as well as their ultimate beliefs — usually the same as or related with their cultural's worldview but not always — around questions like reality, substance, causality, properties, relations, categories of beings, universals, particulars, space, time, freedom, etc.<ref>Sjöstedt-Hughes, P. (2023). On the need for metaphysics in psychedelic therapy and research. ''Frontiers in Psychology'', ''14'', [[1128589. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1128589]]</ref> We'll go over the following aspects:

OlivierSandilands: /* The relationship between states and metaphysical beliefs… and back */

2025-08-30T20:18:15Z

The relationship between states and metaphysical beliefs… and back

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	=== The relationship between states and metaphysical beliefs… and back ===		=== The relationship between states and metaphysical beliefs… and back ===
	Bitbol on the relationship between particular mind states and metaphysical theories.		Bitbol on the relationship between particular mind states and metaphysical theories: <blockquote>"Instead of hoping that the nature of conscious experience will be revealed by a theory, it is from now on inevitable to instead ask fluxing experience itself to exhibit the nature of theories. [...] Each thesis about conscious experience depends on a state of conscious experience; [...] abstractedly defending a theory about conscious experience amounts to contracting into one of the possible postures of experience being lived. [...] There is a mutual dependency between conceptions of consciousness and the state of consciousness of those who defend them."<ref>Bitbol, ''Does consciousness have an origin?'', 2018, p.301, p. 685</ref></blockquote>

	"Instead of hoping that the nature of conscious experience will be revealed by a theory, it is from now on inevitable to instead ask fluxing experience itself to exhibit the nature of theories. [...] Each thesis about conscious experience depends on a state of conscious experience; [...] abstractedly defending a theory about conscious experience amounts to contracting into one of the possible postures of experience being lived. [...] There is a mutual dependency between conceptions of consciousness and the state of consciousness of those who defend them."<ref>Bitbol, ''Does consciousness have an origin?'', 2018, p.301, p. 685</ref>

	=== The logic of being ===		=== The logic of being ===

OlivierSandilands: /* Non-foundationalist non-substantialism */

2025-08-30T20:17:49Z

Non-foundationalist non-substantialism

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	== Non-foundationalist non-substantialism ==		== Non-foundationalist non-substantialism ==
	A non-foundationalist perspective ~~consider~~ that no absolute or ultimate metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from empirical evidence, because this relies on epistemological assumptions which cannot be given any ultimate ground; there are no ultimate ~~foundation~~ to knowledge.		A non-foundationalist perspective considers that no absolute or ultimate metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from empirical evidence, because this relies on epistemological assumptions which cannot be given any ultimate ground; there are no ultimate foundations to knowledge.

	What is the absolute justification that empirical experience from phenomenal observation is a valid source of truth about reality? Suppose that there is a "real reality" out there from which our lived reality (consciousness) originates. Why suppose that it obeys the laws of our phenomenal existence? And why suppose the genesis of our phenomenal existence happens in ways which resemble the causality our lives seem ruled by?		What is the absolute justification that empirical experience from phenomenal observation is a valid source of truth about reality? Suppose that there is a "real reality" out there from which our lived reality (consciousness) originates. Why suppose that it obeys the laws of our phenomenal existence? And why suppose the genesis of our phenomenal existence happens in ways which resemble the causality our lives seem ruled by?

OlivierSandilands at 20:17, 30 August 2025

2025-08-30T20:17:25Z

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	One must see clearly, here, that, keeping in mind the previous definition, quantum mechanics ''is a metaphysical theory''. One that is rooted in scientific methodologies, empirical testing, and continual revision, allowing for a level of technical control and predictive power which is unparalleled — but a metaphysical theory nonetheless.		One must see clearly, here, that, keeping in mind the previous definition, quantum mechanics ''is a metaphysical theory''. One that is rooted in scientific methodologies, empirical testing, and continual revision, allowing for a level of technical control and predictive power which is unparalleled — but a metaphysical theory nonetheless.

	The question is then - what is the status of scientific theories? Current cutting-edge approaches, rather than ''substantializing'' or ''re-ifying'' - that is to say, "making into a real thing" - the objects and laws described by ~~contemnporary~~ physical theories		The question is then - what is the status of scientific theories? Current cutting-edge approaches, rather than ''substantializing'' or ''re-ifying'' - that is to say, "making into a real thing" - the objects and laws described by contemporary physical theories

	By contrast, a non-substantialist perspective would argue that there is ''nothing'' that stands under, or beyond, appearances. An interpretation of physical theories that may stem from such an attitude, could be to consider that instead of representing an external substantial reality beyond appearances which the theories describe, these theories are ''formalizations of know-how'' and ''prediction-making'' tools, which account for there probabilistic nature - instead of reality being inherently probabilistic. This is beyond the scope of our discussion, but students interested in this may look into recent developments in the area of philosophy of science which seek to provide a phenomenal grounding to quantum theories.		By contrast, a non-substantialist perspective would argue that there is ''nothing'' that stands under, or beyond, appearances. An interpretation of physical theories that may stem from such an attitude, could be to consider that instead of representing an external substantial reality beyond appearances which the theories describe, these theories are ''formalizations of know-how'' and ''prediction-making'' tools, which account for there probabilistic nature - instead of reality being inherently probabilistic. This is beyond the scope of our discussion, but students interested in this may look into recent developments in the area of philosophy of science which seek to provide a phenomenal grounding to quantum theories.
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	Undoubtedly in our daily life we do not pay attention to this consciousness which constitutes the world of our habitual environment. We perceive the house and are inattentive to our perception of the house. We are always aware of the world and never aware of our awareness of the world. It is the task of philosophy to bring to the forefront this untiring activity of the consciousness that perceives the world, that conceives the idealities and abstractions of science, that imagines, that remembers, etc., thus producing all the unreal representations that never cease to accompany the course of our real life."</blockquote>''Barbarism, p. 20''<ref>Henry, M. (2012). ''Barbarism'' (S. Davidson, Trans.). Continuum.</ref>		Undoubtedly in our daily life we do not pay attention to this consciousness which constitutes the world of our habitual environment. We perceive the house and are inattentive to our perception of the house. We are always aware of the world and never aware of our awareness of the world. It is the task of philosophy to bring to the forefront this untiring activity of the consciousness that perceives the world, that conceives the idealities and abstractions of science, that imagines, that remembers, etc., thus producing all the unreal representations that never cease to accompany the course of our real life."</blockquote>''Barbarism, p. 20''<ref>Henry, M. (2012). ''Barbarism'' (S. Davidson, Trans.). Continuum.</ref>

	Michel Henry: I am the truth, p. 156-157, ~~where he denied~~ that such a thing as a subjectivity or fixed identity, an "empirical individual", could be found as an object or subject within or as experience. His radical critique of what he called elsewhere “transcendental egotism” is thus summarized: “If by man we understand, as is usual, the empirical individual” [p.156], “man doesn’t exist”. “Worldly man is but an optical illusion.” [p.157].<ref name=":0">Henry, M. (2003). ''I am the truth: toward a philosophy of Christianity''. Stanford University Press.</ref>		Michel Henry: I am the truth, p. 156-157, denies that such a thing as a subjectivity or fixed identity, an "empirical individual", could be found as an object or subject within or as experience. His radical critique of what he called elsewhere “transcendental egotism” is thus summarized: “If by man we understand, as is usual, the empirical individual” [p.156], “man doesn’t exist”. “Worldly man is but an optical illusion.” [p.157].<ref name=":0">Henry, M. (2003). ''I am the truth: toward a philosophy of Christianity''. Stanford University Press.</ref>

	Michel Henry, whose work was heavily influenced by Meister Eckhart, went further and claimed that what he found out is also the essential meaning of the Christian revelation,<ref name=":0" /> and in this he seems very close from contemporary mystics like Bernadette Roberts.<ref>Roberts, B. (1991). ''The path to no-self: life at the center''. State University of New York Press.</ref><ref>Roberts, B. (1993). ''The experience of no-self: a contemplative journey'' (Rev. ed). State University of New York.</ref>		Michel Henry, whose work was heavily influenced by Meister Eckhart, went further and claimed that what he found out is also the essential meaning of the Christian revelation,<ref name=":0" /> and in this he seems very close from contemporary mystics like Bernadette Roberts.<ref>Roberts, B. (1991). ''The path to no-self: life at the center''. State University of New York Press.</ref><ref>Roberts, B. (1993). ''The experience of no-self: a contemplative journey'' (Rev. ed). State University of New York.</ref>

OlivierSandilands at 16:57, 14 March 2025

2025-03-14T16:57:09Z

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	~~EPEEs~~ are profoundly intertwined with beliefs, metaphysics and philosophy. [[Tradition:Source Traditions\|Source traditions]] (religions, philosophies, spiritualities) but also in many cases academic and scientific [[disciplines]] usually revolve around specific stories of the origins and ends of the world, the nature		[[Synthesis:Emergent Phenomena\|Emergent phenomena]] are profoundly intertwined with beliefs, metaphysics and philosophy. [[Tradition:Source Traditions\|Source traditions]] (religions, philosophies, spiritualities) but also in many cases academic and scientific [[disciplines]] usually revolve around specific stories of the origins and ends of the world, the nature

	This domain includes a huge variety of relative idiosyncratic or culturally informed beliefs of the individual, as well as their ultimate beliefs — usually the same as or related with their cultural's worldview but not always — around questions like reality, substance, causality, properties, relations, categories of beings, universals, particulars, space, time, freedom, etc.<ref>Sjöstedt-Hughes, P. (2023). On the need for metaphysics in psychedelic therapy and research. ''Frontiers in Psychology'', ''14'', [[1128589. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1128589]]</ref> We'll go over the following aspects:		This domain includes a huge variety of relative idiosyncratic or culturally informed beliefs of the individual, as well as their ultimate beliefs — usually the same as or related with their cultural's worldview but not always — around questions like reality, substance, causality, properties, relations, categories of beings, universals, particulars, space, time, freedom, etc.<ref>Sjöstedt-Hughes, P. (2023). On the need for metaphysics in psychedelic therapy and research. ''Frontiers in Psychology'', ''14'', [[1128589. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1128589]]</ref> We'll go over the following aspects:

OlivierSandilands: /* A word on metaphysics */

2025-03-14T16:56:38Z

A word on metaphysics

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	EPEEs are profoundly intertwined with beliefs, metaphysics and philosophy. [[Tradition:Source Traditions\|Source traditions]] (religions, philosophies, spiritualities) but also in many cases academic and scientific [[disciplines]] usually revolve around specific stories of the origins and ends of the world, the nature		EPEEs are profoundly intertwined with beliefs, metaphysics and philosophy. [[Tradition:Source Traditions\|Source traditions]] (religions, philosophies, spiritualities) but also in many cases academic and scientific [[disciplines]] usually revolve around specific stories of the origins and ends of the world, the nature

	This domain includes a huge variety of relative idiosyncratic or culturally informed beliefs of the individual, as well as their ultimate beliefs — usually the same as or related with their cultural's worldview but not always — ~~which include~~ the following aspects:		This domain includes a huge variety of relative idiosyncratic or culturally informed beliefs of the individual, as well as their ultimate beliefs — usually the same as or related with their cultural's worldview but not always — around questions like reality, substance, causality, properties, relations, categories of beings, universals, particulars, space, time, freedom, etc.<ref>Sjöstedt-Hughes, P. (2023). On the need for metaphysics in psychedelic therapy and research. ''Frontiers in Psychology'', ''14'', [[1128589. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1128589]]</ref> We'll go over the following aspects:

	* Metaphysics		* Metaphysics
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	= A word on metaphysics =		= A word on metaphysics =
	Metaphysics is the realm of our most deeply held beliefs about and representations of the universe and the beings it contains, its origins, the nature of our experience, and what may lay beyond our subjective experience - whether they be the images of ourselves we hold in our hearts, our sense of the cosmos we inhabit, our notions of what is real or not, and what at the innermost level we hold as being true. One may reasonably argue that all people have metaphysical beliefs, whether they are aware of them or not. In fact, some claim that "whole cosmologies are wrapped up in single perceptions" (Rob Burbea). Thus it is very interesting — and has been a very common practice throughout history and even today — to ask questions about metaphysics and shed an introspective light on our own beliefs.		Metaphysics is the realm of our most deeply held beliefs about and representations of the universe and the beings it contains, its origins, the nature of our experience, and what may lay beyond our subjective experience — whether they be the images of ourselves we hold in our hearts, our sense of the cosmos we inhabit, our notions of what is real or not, and what at the innermost level we hold as being true. One may reasonably argue that all people have metaphysical beliefs, whether they are aware of them or not. In fact, some claim that "whole cosmologies are wrapped up in single perceptions" (Rob Burbea). Thus it is very interesting — and has been a very common practice throughout history and even today — to ask questions about metaphysics and shed an introspective light on our own beliefs.

	Worldviews ~~abound~~. Many authors, schools of thought, religions, philosophies, and even scientists, have proposed views and conceptions about the beings that populate this universe, the ultimate nature of our experience or of the cosmos, and of the ways to reach truth. Depending on what they consider as "really" existing and whether that is one, two, or many things, we can distinguish between various systems.		Worldviews are infinitely varied. Many authors, schools of thought, religions, philosophies, and even scientists, have proposed views and conceptions about the beings that populate this universe, the ultimate nature of our experience or of the cosmos, and of the ways to reach truth. Depending on what they consider as "really" existing and whether that is one, two, or many things, we can distinguish between various systems.

	= A word on epistemology =		= A word on epistemology =

OlivierSandilands: /* The logic of being */

2025-03-14T16:53:12Z

The logic of being

OlivierSandilands: /* The logic of being */

2025-03-14T16:45:21Z

The logic of being

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	The Eleatic school, formost among which was Parmenides, also employed logical arguments to show the intenable paradoxes of ordinary ontological categories and destroy all dualities — which in Greek are called ''doxa'' (''δόξα''), the "opinions of mortal men", the appearances of the "natural" world. The most famous one is about Achilles and the tortoise, which is not often presented as the deep negation of the possibility of movement as it is ordinarily conceived, but rather as a sort of logical game illustrating the mathematical notion of limit. However, it goes much deeper than that.		The Eleatic school, formost among which was Parmenides, also employed logical arguments to show the intenable paradoxes of ordinary ontological categories and destroy all dualities — which in Greek are called ''doxa'' (''δόξα''), the "opinions of mortal men", the appearances of the "natural" world. The most famous one is about Achilles and the tortoise, which is not often presented as the deep negation of the possibility of movement as it is ordinarily conceived, but rather as a sort of logical game illustrating the mathematical notion of limit. However, it goes much deeper than that.



	Compare the opening stance to Nāgārjuna's ''Fundamental wisdom of the middle-way:''<blockquote>"Whatever is dependently arisen is Unceasing, unborn, Unannihilated, not permanent, Not coming, not going, Without distinction, without identity, And free from conceptual construction."<ref>https://terebess.hu/english/Nagarjuna.pdf, see e.g. Nāgārjuna. (1995). ''The fundamental wisdom of the middle way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'' (J. L. Garfield, Trans.). Oxford University Press. </ref> </blockquote>With section VIII of Parmenides' ''Poem'':<blockquote>VIII		Compare the opening stance to Nāgārjuna's ''Fundamental wisdom of the middle-way:''<blockquote>"Whatever is dependently arisen is Unceasing, unborn, Unannihilated, not permanent, Not coming, not going, Without distinction, without identity, And free from conceptual construction."<ref>https://terebess.hu/english/Nagarjuna.pdf, see e.g. Nāgārjuna. (1995). ''The fundamental wisdom of the middle way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'' (J. L. Garfield, Trans.). Oxford University Press. </ref> </blockquote>With section VIII of Parmenides' ''Poem'':<blockquote>VIII

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	Many branches of Buddhism — madhyamika in particular and related prajñaparamita-influenced schools — are non-substantialist, meaning that, going one step further than phenomenal ontologies which don't consider that there is any "really existing" entity or substance "out there" beyond appearances, they also deny, usually through elaborate logical reasonings, that phenomenality or "pure experience" are not to be reified into a "really existing" thing independent of the experience of it in the moment either) and also non-foundationalist.		Many branches of Buddhism — madhyamika in particular and related prajñaparamita-influenced schools — are non-substantialist, meaning that, going one step further than phenomenal ontologies which don't consider that there is any "really existing" entity or substance "out there" beyond appearances, they also deny, usually through elaborate logical reasonings, that phenomenality or "pure experience" are not to be reified into a "really existing" thing independent of the experience of it in the moment either) and also non-foundationalist.

	Consider, for instance, the question of subject–object duality from a logical perspective. Madhyamika reasoning can help us understand and see how "consciousness" and its "objects" cannot be ontologically distinguished, either spatially or temporally. See stanza 93, chapter IX in Śantideva's magnum opus, the ''Bodhicaryāvatara'', which is about "wisdom", and which shows the problem with introducing "spatial" distinctions between "consciousness" and "the world":		Consider, for instance, the question of subject–object duality from a logical perspective. Madhyamika reasoning can help us understand and see how "consciousness" and its "objects" cannot be ontologically distinguished, either spatially or temporally. See stanza 93, chapter IX in Śantideva's magnum opus, the ''Bodhicaryāvatara'', which is about "wisdom", and which shows the problem with introducing "spatial" distinctions between "consciousness" and "the world": <blockquote>"If a space separates the faculty from its object,

	"If a space separates the faculty from its object,

	How would they come into contact?		How would they come into contact?
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	If no space separates them, then they will be one,		If no space separates them, then they will be one,

	And in this case, what would come into contact with what?"		And in this case, what would come into contact with what?"<ref>Lavis, A. (2018). ''La conscience à l’épreuve de l’éveil: lecture, commentaire et traduction du “Bodhicaryāvatāra” de Śāntideva. [Consciousness at the test of awakening: a reading, commentary and translation of Śāntideva’s “Bodhicaryāvatāra”.]''. Éditions du Cerf.</ref></blockquote>This applies to "moments in time" also. Examine a moment in time, with a beginning, middle and end. Then take another moment of time. What could be the connection between these distinct moments? They would be entirely external to one another.

	~~This applies~~ to "~~moments in time~~" ~~also. Examine a moment~~ in ~~time, with~~ a ~~beginning~~, ~~middle~~ and ~~end~~. ~~Then take another moment of time~~. ~~What could be the connection between these distinct moments~~? ~~They would be entirely external to one another~~.		Such powerful and concise arguments seem to go a step beyond some of the phenomenological ontologies we just reviewed. In particular, the paradoxes implied in Michel Henry's affirmation that reality is "absolute self-affectivity with no distance" are revealed in a clear light, and intuit how philosophies of unity or "co-incidence" can actually become sterile.<ref>Jullien, F. (2017). ''Dé-coïncidence : D’où viennent l’art et l’existence?'' Grasset.</ref>

	The Eleatic school, formost among which was Parmenides, also employed logical arguments to show the intenable paradoxes of ordinary ontological categories and destroy all dualities — which in Greek are called ''doxa'' (''δόξα''), the "opinions of mortal men", the appearances of the "natural" world. The most famous one is about Achilles and the tortoise, which is not often presented as the deep negation of the possibility of movement as it is ordinarily conceived, but rather as a sort of logical game illustrating the mathematical notion of limit. However, it goes much deeper than that.		The Eleatic school, formost among which was Parmenides, also employed logical arguments to show the intenable paradoxes of ordinary ontological categories and destroy all dualities — which in Greek are called ''doxa'' (''δόξα''), the "opinions of mortal men", the appearances of the "natural" world. The most famous one is about Achilles and the tortoise, which is not often presented as the deep negation of the possibility of movement as it is ordinarily conceived, but rather as a sort of logical game illustrating the mathematical notion of limit. However, it goes much deeper than that.
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	Merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily, life is but a dream."</blockquote><blockquote>"We are such stuff as dreams are made of, and our little life is rounded with a sleep."		Merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily, life is but a dream."</blockquote><blockquote>"We are such stuff as dreams are made of, and our little life is rounded with a sleep."

	Shakespeare, ''The Tempest''</blockquote>The ''prajñaparamita'' refutation of all ontological affirmation, best exemplified in the concise text of the ''Heart sutra'', leads to a fundamental groundlessness and the playful, mysterious display of appearances seen as devoid of substance, which finds poetic expression in the ''Diamond sutra'':<blockquote>“So I say to you –		Shakespeare, ''The Tempest''</blockquote>The ''prajñaparamita'' refutation of all ontological affirmation, best exemplified in the concise text of the ''Heart sutra'', insubstantiality leads to a fundamental ''groundlessness'' and the playful, mysterious display of appearances seen as devoid of substance, which finds poetic expression in the ''Diamond sutra'':<blockquote>“So I say to you –

	This is how to contemplate our conditioned existence in this fleeting world:”		This is how to contemplate our conditioned existence in this fleeting world:”