Synthesis:Beliefs and Worldviews

OlivierSandilands — Wed, 08 Jul 2026 08:47:10 GMT

Unknowing and mystery

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 === Unknowing and mystery ===
-Many of the world's great mystics expound views of this sort. After all, the word "mystic" comes from "mystery". that of these systems which exhibit the radical limitations of any objective knowledge, theoretical knowledge, representational knowledge. This is sometimes done in favor of non-objective knowledge. Thus we are brought back from the order of metaphysical theories to the realm of practice — for non-objective knowledge is practical knowledge.
+Many of the world's great mystics expound views of this sort. After all, the word "mystic" comes from "mystery". that of these systems which exhibit the radical limitations of any objective knowledge, theoretical knowledge, representational knowledge. This is sometimes done in favor of non-objective knowledge. Thus we are brought back from the order of metaphysical theories to the realm of practice — for non-objective knowledge is practical knowledge. This is sometimes dismissed as "Mysterianism", it seems to be where many contemplatives eventually lend in terms of seeking absolute answers to questions which are by necessity relative to linguistic categories; some examples for instance are Meister Eckhart or the cloude of Unknowing.
 == Ontological agnosticism ==
 == Can we say anything about the "origin" or "nature" of "consciousness"? ==
-So, on the epistemological level, and using Kantian terms, QRI asks a question of an ''a priori'' type (having to do with intuition not deduction) and seeks to answer them through ''a posteriori'' procedures (empirical evidence), or in his and later uses of these terms, confuses the empirical and the transcendental. Methodologically, this then calls to use objective empirical methods to explore "something" non-objective — for consciousness is not an object in the way that a "ball falling to the ground" is an object. If it was, then what is it that would observe that object, since "consciousness" is supposed to be "what observes"? Not only is consciousness non-objective, but it cannot be distinguished from its objects — this is both an experiential fact and a logical necessity: examine Santideva's verse
+So, on the epistemological level, and using Kantian terms, asking about the "origin" of consciousness is a question of an ''a priori'' type (having to do with intuition not deduction) and seeking to answer them through ''a posteriori'' procedures (empirical evidence), or in his and later uses of these terms, confuses the empirical and the transcendental. Methodologically, this then calls to use objective empirical methods to explore "something" non-objective — for consciousness is not an object in the way that a "ball falling to the ground" is an object. If it was, then what is it that would observe that object, since "consciousness" is supposed to be "what observes"? Not only is consciousness non-objective, but it cannot be distinguished from its objects — this is both an experiential fact and a logical necessity: examine Santideva's verse quoted above.
-"If a space separates the faculty from its object,/How would they come into contact?/If no space separates them, then they will be one,/And in this case, what would come into contact with what?"
+This forgets the initial epistemological made above. ''A priori'' knowledge is knowledge that cannot be derived from experience, or maybe better said — is presupposed in all experience: e.g. the ''a prioris'' of sensibility in Kant's system are "time" and "space". I would say that "consciousness" is presupposed in all experience, i.e. there cannot be any experience without there being "experientiality" or consciousness that co-arises with it and as its very phenomenal substance.
 Note that if by "consciousness" is meant a more restricted meaning of "the mind" or "the mental sense sphere", then one only needs to apply the previous reasoning to the specific faculty to prove that it is not a product of "the brain". But this is not an empirical observation. Empirical observation can't say anything about the brain, because empirically speaking, there is no brain, i.e., the "brain", as all objects, is a transcendent, it transcends individual experience (and according to some, is the cause of it, and "experience" is a sort of byproduct or even representation "in the brain", which also implies that the brain cannot be observed.)
-Finally, more generally, there are logical issues which apply to realist approaches in general, but which in this context point to specific problems regarding the "causes" and the notion of an "origin" of consciousness (viewed as a "thing", i.e., reified). The paradoxes of realist views are thoroughly examined in philosophical texts such as the prajñaparamita literature (Heart and Diamond Sutras being some of the best known examples as well as  Nagarjuna's works<ref>https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/mipham/four-great-logical-arguments</ref>), which uses deep logical arguments disprove substantial/independent existence. The pre-socratic Eleatic school employed similar logical arguments to arrive at comparable conclusion, as seen for instance in Parmenides' poem, although his treatment is less systematic and extensive, but more poetic.
+Finally, more generally, there are logical issues which apply to realist approaches in general, but which in this context point to specific problems regarding the causes and condition the notion of an "origin" of consciousness (viewed as a "thing", i.e., reified). The paradoxes of realist views are thoroughly examined in philosophical texts such as the prajñaparamita literature (Heart and Diamond Sutras being some of the best known examples as well as  Nagarjuna's works<ref>https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/mipham/four-great-logical-arguments</ref>), which uses deep logical arguments disprove substantial/independent existence — the following contains a summary of the four main types of logical reasonings used in the madhyamaka tradition to refute such ideas: <nowiki>https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/mipham/four-great-logical-arguments</nowiki>. The pre-socratic Eleatic school employed similar logical arguments to arrive at comparable conclusion, as seen for instance in Parmenides' poem above, although his treatment is less systematic and extensive, but more poetic.
 == References ==

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Synthesis:Beliefs and Worldviews